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As a significant period of lobbying on the UK Coalition Government’s welfare reforms draws towards a 
conclusion, housing bodies in Scotland and across the UK are now looking increasingly to the future.
Both CIH Scotland and SFHA are focusing on helping landlords prepare for managing the various challenges 
stemming from the reforms. The key objective is to help our respective members support their tenants through 
the most radical set of welfare reforms we have seen for a couple of decades. .
It also means looking at the bigger policy picture. Never before has there been such heightened awareness of 
the impact which UK policies have on devolved housing policy in Scotland. Alongside this, the referendum on 
independence for Scotland is expected in 2014. 
Against this background, this report looks at what the arguments might be for devolving Housing Benefit to 
Scotland, firstly within the existing arrangements and secondly within any “devolution max” system.
There can be no doubt that this is a complex issue. We are grateful to Ken Gibb and Mark Stephens for setting 
out the potential options in what we believe is a very accessible manner. Our intention in publishing this report 
is to kick start an important debate. Both CIH Scotland and SFHA look forward to playing a proactive part in 
ongoing discussions on this critically important issue for tenants, landlords and the Scottish housing system  
as a whole.
Jim Strang, Chair, CIH Scotland   Teresa McNally, Chair, SFHA
Foreword 1. Introduction
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CIH Scotland and the SFHA commissioned the authors 
to write a short discussion paper that considers the 
scope and implications of devolving UK-reserved 
Housing Benefit (HB) to Scotland. This ambition was 
an SNP 2011 election manifesto pledge, though it is 
not one of the subsequent six Government priorities. 
Nonetheless, we understand that the Scottish 
Government is actively exploring the question. CIH 
thought that the time was therefore ripe to explore 
this in more detail and to at least consider the 
possibilities that might arise if such  
a decision was taken.
The paper is organised in three main sections, aside 
from Introduction and Conclusion. First, the policy 
context is outlined. How does HB currently operate 
in the UK and what impact has devolution made on 
the system and its finances thus far? The UK Benefits 
system, including HB, is currently under close scrutiny 
and we briefly outline the Coalition Government cuts 
agenda and the proposals for a Universal Credit (UC). 
The section also takes a close look at recent proposals 
to extend devolution in Scotland and how this has 
led to discussion about devolving HB – and what this 
actually might mean. 
The second main section of the paper explores 
the practicalities, risks and challenges of devolving 
Housing Benefit under current constitutional 
arrangements (that is, with social security treated 
as a reserved function). Key problems relate to 
disentangling HB from the proposed Universal Credit 
and the rest of the non-devolved social security 
system, the deal with Westminster over the financial 
settlement and the likely problems over the adequacy 
of resources to enable meaningful delivery of a 
Scottish version of Housing Benefit. The penultimate 
section of the paper stands back and asks – if there 
was ‘devolution max’ and social security was essentially 
devolved, what options might be available and 
what issues would therefore arise if we were to take 
Scotland running low income personal housing 
subsidies seriously? The final section summarises  
and concludes.
1. Introduction
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The current system
Housing Benefit is nested within and essential to the 
present working of means-tested benefits within the 
reserved UK system of social security. 
The national Housing Benefit scheme was first 
introduced in the early 1970s, and the present system 
is essentially that which has operated since the last 
major reform of social security in 1988. Eligibility is 
limited to tenants, but extends to both those who are 
in or out of work (subject to a means-test).
At its simplest, Housing Benefit helps low income 
renters pay for their housing costs (a separate scheme 
exists for mortgagors qualifying for income support).
It fulfils two essential functions:
•	 Income	maintenance:	Housing	Benefit	is	
designed to protect incomes after rents to ensure 
that households can purchase sufficient other 
necessities.
•	 Affordability:	Housing	Benefit	limits	the	burden		 	
of housing costs to some households so that they 
do not absorb a disproportionate amount of the 
household budget.
It is this essential dualism (or ambiguity) between 
the housing policy objectives and those of income 
maintenance that sets the UK system apart from its 
continental counterparts and is at the heart of many of 
its difficulties.
The income maintenance objective became more 
explicit in the system introduced in 1988. It explains 
why (in principle) Housing Benefit can pay the whole 
of someone’s rent and why (in principle) a rent increase 
in its entirety can be met by it.
It is much more complex in reality (as we describe 
below), but these underlying principles help to explain 
why it is difficult to reform in the ways that many 
would like. The UK housing lobby has often been 
drawn to other European housing allowance models 
where, to simplify, less generous targeted allowances 
have operated alongside more generous systems of 
social security and pensions (see: Kemp, editor, 2007). 
The UK is unique in making no allowance for housing 
costs within its mainstream social security benefits. 
The fundamental tension between these two roles is a 
theme we return to throughout this paper.
Once we look behind the underlying principles of the 
Housing Benefit system, we find that it is actually a 
series of mini-systems varied according to the rental 
tenure they work within.
Local authority tenants receive rent rebates, which 
are operated as deductions from their rents. They 
are directly applied to the individual rent statements 
of tenants by the council, which also administers 
the system. An assumption is made in the financial 
settlement for the Scottish Parliament each year 
relating to average rent increases and their consequent 
impact on the Rent Rebate bill, which is an explicit part 
of the Parliament’s public spending block.
Eligible housing association tenants receive a rent 
allowance, which, for virtually all intents, is the same 
system from the point of view of tenants, though it 
is not controlled fiscally in the same way and has no 
direct implications for the Scottish Block, as it is funded 
directly by the Department for Work and Pensions. 
2. Policy context 
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Private	tenants	are,	however,	treated	differently	
through the Local Housing Allowance (LHA) system. 
At this point it is simplest to explain how the Local 
Housing Allowance works by demonstrating how the 
more general Housing Benefit system works.
The general position for a social (council or housing 
association) tenant in terms of eligibility is that, 
provided their rent is less than or equal to their eligible 
housing cost ceiling, they will have all of their rent met 
by Housing Benefit if their assessed weekly income 
is less than or equal to the assessed need for their 
household circumstances (the applicable amount of 
the income support scheme, modified for Housing 
Benefit purposes – e.g. employing assumptions about 
the levels of savings allowed). Should their income rise 
above the assessed need threshold, there is a 65 pence 
reduction in Housing Benefit for every pound that 
income exceeds the applicable amount (until it falls to 
zero). This can be described in formula terms as:
HB = ER (where income [Y] is less than or equal 
to assessed need [A], and ER represents eligible rent)
Or  (if income [Y] is greater than assessed need [A]):
HB = ER – 0.65 (Y-A).
The key point of this approach is that HB prevents 
eligible rents from taking incomes below social 
assistance (e.g. JSA, IS, Pension Credit) levels while 
rising rents will be fully met provided they remain 
within eligible housing cost limits. At the same time, 
rising rents will draw more households into eligibility. 
This is reinforced by the practice of the great majority 
of housing association landlords receiving Housing 
Benefit directly from the administrating local authority 
rather than via the tenant. This practice of  ‘Rent Direct’ 
ensures rent/benefit payments reach the landlord and 
helps to reduce the incidence of arrears but it also 
further disconnects the tenant from the responsibility 
for meeting their housing costs.
There are further complexities to the system. Eligible 
recipients receive ‘earnings disregards’ that do not 
count as assessed income in order to encourage work, 
thus slightly improving their position. Second, adult 
children or other non-dependents living in a larger 
household are assumed to make a contribution to 
the rent. Thus eligible rent is reduced through ‘non-
dependent	deductions’,	effectively	reducing	Housing	
Benefit. Third, the system discourages young people 
(aged under 26) from living independently by setting 
a Housing Benefit ceiling (the ‘single room rent’) as if 
they lived in shared bedsit accommodation.
The	main	difference	for	private	tenants	is	the	Local	
Housing Allowance. LHA was introduced in 2008 as 
an attempt to introduce more choice into tenants’ 
housing decisions by introducing ‘shopping incentives’. 
On the face of it, it looks to be more like a continental 
housing allowance. But it is not as simple as that. LHA 
sets standard eligible rents at the median market 
rent	for	broad	market	rental	areas	for	different	sizes	
of properties. In principle, where an eligible private 
tenant received that allowance, and if rents are less 
than the allowance, the claimant could keep part 
of	the	difference	(up	to	£15)	–	thereby	rewarding	
shopping around for value. But if the rent was above 
the median, the tenant would have to pay the 
difference.	If	a	tenant’s	circumstances	and	hence	
income changes, this will be reflected in eligible 
Housing Benefit in the same way as in the formula 
above. The other key feature of the Local Housing 
Allowance is that with the exception of those tenants 
deemed to be vulnerable and those already in arrears, 
the benefit takes the form of a cheque or bank transfer 
to tenants – there are no direct payments to landlords. 
Reforms to the Local Housing Allowance and to the 
more general system of Housing Benefit have taken 
place since the UK Coalition Government came to 
power in the summer of 2010 and further longer-term 
proposals are going through Parliament. As a result, 
the	system	will	operate	differently	and	be	significantly	
less generous. These reforms are discussed in  
detail below.
To recap, the key structural points about how the UK 
housing benefit system operates are:
•	 There	is	a	fundamental	tension	between	the	 
social security and housing objectives of the  
current system.
•	 The	system	provides	weak	incentives	to	constrain	
housing costs and this has led to increasingly  
onerous limitations on eligible rents, especially in  
the private rented sector (PRS). 
•	 Private	tenants	have	an	allowance	system	grafted		
on to the income maintenance component of  
the system.
•	 Housing	Benefit	is	an	in-work	as	well	as	out-of-work	
benefit, so weakens the ‘unemployment   
trap’.	However,	it	suffers	from	a	low	take-up	among	
people in work and the ‘taper’ may create work 
disincentives.
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•	 Housing	tenure	determines	the	generosity	of	
the system. A separate and more limited scheme 
is	available	to	homeowners,	but	the	differences		
between rental tenures are becoming greater.
•	 As	we	go	on	to	examine,	the	high	and	rising	cost	of	
the system makes it a target for expenditure cuts.
An analysis of the consequences of devolving Housing 
Benefit	is	not	just	about	fiscal	decisions	in	different	
parts of the UK. It is, we believe, helpful that such a 
consideration	also	offers	the	chance	to	address	what	
is required to remedy the structural or system design 
tensions outlined above.
Expenditure and caseload
Pawson and Wilcox (2010) set out the expenditure 
and caseload associated with Housing Benefit and 
also the characteristics of those receiving help with 
paying for their housing. Measured in cash terms, GB 
Housing	Benefit	was	£11.652	billion	in	2000-01	and	
rose	to	£17.501	billion	in	2008-09.	The	estimated	out-
turn	figure	for	2009-10	was	£20.444	billion	and	the	
planned	figure	for	2010-11	was	in	excess	of	£22	billion	
(Pawson and Wilcox, 2010, Table 114). Over the period 
since 2000-01, cash rent rebates (i.e. payments to 
council tenants) have been fairly flat (i.e. falling in real 
terms) whereas rent allowances have trebled in cash 
terms. A large part of this change is the result of tenure 
composition shifts following from stock transfer.
The caseload evidence suggests a significant fall in 
rent rebate cases (from 2.1 million in 2001 to 1.5 million 
in 2010 for GB) compared with a near doubling in 
rent allowances (from 1.7 million to 3.2 million across 
the same period). The average GB weekly rent rebate 
payment	rose	from	£43.90	in	2001	to	£67.65	in	2010,	
but the average equivalent rent allowance rose from 
£60	in	2001	to	£91.83	in	2010	(Pawson	and	Wilcox,	
2010, Table 115a). Further disaggregation of the rent 
allowance data between housing associations and 
private rented housing confirms large caseload growth 
for both (not quite doubling between 2001 and 2010) 
with the association caseload still slightly larger. Most 
tellingly, however, private rented average HB payments 
have grown significantly above association HB 
payments (a ratio of 1.4:1 in 2010 – Pawson and Wilcox, 
2010, Table 116b).
Looking at Scotland, the rent rebate caseload fell 
from 214,000 in 2001 to 151,000 in 2010, whereas rent 
allowances increased from 92,000 to 186,000 in the 
same period. Average weekly HB payments increased 
for	rent	rebate	claimants	from	£30.70	to	£50.38,	but	for	
rent allowance cases the figure grew between 2001 
and	2010	from	£39.00	to	£63.50	(Pawson	and	Wilcox,	
2010, Tables 115b and 115c). The Scottish Government 
also reports (pp.10-11) that the largest single group 
receiving HB is the over 65s (which is otherwise flatly 
distributed by age). Nearly two in three recipients are 
single people without dependents but almost one in 
five are single parent households. Only 6% are couples 
with dependent children.
To summarise, since 2001 there has been a decrease 
in the number of Housing Benefit claims from council 
tenants. This has arisen mainly due to stock transfer to 
housing associations. The proportionate reduction has 
been similar in Scotland (29%) and Great Britain as a 
whole (28.5%). In contrast, claims for Rent Assistance 
have risen – by 54% in Great Britain and by 62% in 
Scotland. This is mostly attributable to stock transfer, 
but also due to the expansion in private renting. Even 
though numbers of claimants have fallen, the average 
value of Rent Rebates to council tenants has risen – by 
more than half (54%) in GB and by 62% in Scotland. 
Average Rent Allowance payments have also risen 
more quickly in Scotland – by 64% against 32% in GB.
Based on data for July 2010, Communities Analytical 
Services in the Scottish Government found that 
at a local authority level claimant proportions of 
all households vary significantly from 10% in East 
Dunbartonshire to 30% in Glasgow. Within the Scottish 
HB total, around 9% of households are deemed to be 
in employment, rising to 16% in Edinburgh but as low 
as	6%	in	Falkirk	(pp.8-9).	This	is	very	different	from	the	
rest of Great Britain where more recipients are in work 
than unemployed. Across Scotland, average housing 
benefit	weekly	payments	varied	from	less	than	£54	in	
Moray	and	the	Shetland	Islands	to	£90.17	in	Edinburgh	
(the	Scottish	average	was	£66.62)	–	Communities	
Analytical Services, 2010, Table 2 p.10.
Table 2.1 reports a snapshot comparison of key figures 
between Scotland and GB, in terms of recipient 
numbers, numbers qualifying for other income-related 
benefits or not, and average weekly Housing Benefit 
by tenure. Comparison of the columns suggests that 
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the larger council sector in Scotland captures a larger share of social HB claimants than for GB as a whole. 
It also indicates that the private renting share is correspondingly smaller in Scotland and that a larger 
proportion of HB recipients also receive other means-tested benefits than is the case in GB. Across all 
tenures average weekly HB payments are lower in Scotland though they are ranked by tenure in the same 
way as for GB as a whole.
Coalition Government cuts and the 
Universal Credit
The context within which debate around Housing Benefit’s future within 
a devolved UK is not primarily constitutional but rather the result of the 
present dramatic changes to benefits underway as a result of the policies 
of the UK Government (though politically this has clear constitutional 
bearing). The UK Coalition Government that came to power in June 2010 
from its initial Coalition agreement and followed by an emergency budget 
and Comprehensive Spending Reviews (CSR) later that year signalled an 
overriding focus on budget deficit reduction and that a major plank of that 
strategy would be cuts and restructuring of the benefits system, at the 
centre of which would be reform of Housing Benefit.
Reforms are being introduced over three waves: the Emergency budget 
cuts in June 2010, the CSR reforms and reductions to be phased in over 
a number of years. Moreover, the Department for Work and Pensions 
plans to radically reshape means-tested benefits into a single Universal 
Table 2.1 Housing Benefit: Key Comparisons between Scotland and GB, May 2010
LA tenants (number)
Scotland
207,000
Great Britain
1,511,000
HA tenants (number) 176,000 1,783,000
Private tenants (number) 85,000 1,463,000
Total (number) 468,000 4,768,000
Total passported* 337,000 3,255,000
Total non-passported 131,000 1,507,000
LA tenants (average weekly HB 
payment)
£59.31 £67.66
HA tenants (average weekly HB 
payment)
£61.94 £77.30
Private tenants (average weekly HB 
payment)
£94.00 £109.82
All tenure (average weekly HB 
payment)
£66.58 £84.20
Source: Pawson and Wilcox, 2001, Table 118
Notes: Caseload figures rounded to nearest thousand. Passported cases are those  
where the claimant  is also receiving another means-tested benefit.
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Credit (including Housing Benefit but also implicitly 
incorporating significant further changes to the way 
benefit entitlement works). We consider the main 
changes below.
The Housing Benefit cuts fall into two categories: 
those	that	will	affect	the	private	rented	sector	
through changes to the Local Housing Allowance 
(LHA) and those that will impact on housing benefit  
more generally. 
The changes specific to the private rented sector (the 
LHA) concern:
•	 Originally	planned	to	be	cut	by	New	Labour,	the		 	
removal	of	the	£15	excess	i.e.	tenants	will	no		
longer	be	able	to	keep	the	difference	or	savings		
made	(up	to	£15)	between	actual	rent	paid	and	
the LHA (introduced in April 2011), thereby 
sharpening the shopping incentive into a cap.
•	 The	LHA	calculation	for	eligible	rent	was	changed	
from deriving the LHA with the 30th rather than 
the median (50th percentile) of the local rent 
distribution (introduced in April 2011) – the actual 
reduction will depend on the distribution  of local 
rents, in that a more compressed distribution 
would not require such as large a  fall in the 
LHA as would be the case with a more dispersed 
set	of	local	rents.	Since	the	£15	excess	has	been	
removed, the calculation is now merely a cap.
•	 From	April	2013,	the	basis	of	annual	uprating	will	
change from a proportion of actual market rents 
to the CPI. Over the past decade private rents have 
increased faster than general price inflation. 
•	 A	cap	or	maximum	was	placed	on	LHA	by	room	
size – from April 2011 LHA rates were capped, 
including removing the largest five-bedroom rate 
and	creating	a	£400	per	week	overall	cap	(i.e.	the	
four-bed ceiling).
•	 From	April	2012,	the	coverage	of	the	single	room	
rent for single person household claimants living 
in private rented housing from under 26 will be 
expanded to those up to 35 living alone for new 
tenants and existing tenants after review.
The other main HB changes that will apply across the 
rented housing system are:
•	 Changing	the	rules	for	non-dependent	
deductions, so that previous rent increases are  
now	taken	into	account,	effectively	increasing	
non-dependent deductions and thus reducing HB 
for such households from April 2011. The Scottish 
Local Government Forum against Poverty (2011) 
estimates that the cost of fully uprating these 
deductions back to 2001 will entail an average 27% 
increase in non-dependent deductions, phased in 
over three years (p.19).
•	 From	April	2013,	HB	for	working	age	tenants	
deemed to be under-occupying based on a 
standard regional rate for appropriate  
property sizes1.
•	 There	will	be	a	ceiling	on	all	HB	from	April	2013	 
of	between	£350	to	£500,	depending	on	
household type.
In their impact assessment of the HB changes, the 
Scottish Government (Communities Analytical 
Services, 2011) concluded:
1. Overall, lower rents and a slightly smaller PRS 
in Scotland mean the overall financial and 
quantitative	effect	is	smaller	relative	to	the	rest	
of the UK. Bedroom caps had little impact in 
Scotland because of the generally lower LHA rates 
compared to, for example, Southern England. The 
removal	of	the	£15	excess	would	affect	half	of	
Scottish PRS households on HB, on average losing 
£12	per	week;	the	move	to	the	30th	percentile	
will	affect	79%	of	Scottish	recipient	households	
and	cost	£7	per	week.	Overall,	97%	of	households	
(nearly	55,000)	would	be	worse	off	in	Scotland	as	a	
result of the June 2010 changes, on average losing 
£10	per	week.	
2. However, there are significant variations within 
Scotland with by far the largest impacts in 
Glasgow and Edinburgh. The Government’s 
analysis suggested that post-benefit change, the 
affordability	or	availability	of	Glasgow’s	PRS	would	
fall from 54% to just 31%.
3. Looking at subsequent reforms, it was noted 
that CPI explicitly excludes housing costs, so 
1 A House of Lords amendment to the Bill has largely nullified this element by arguing that since most people cannot move to smaller 
accommodation, this provision should be treated as a tax and therefore exempts households in such circumstances with a spare bedroom 
from the under-occupying reform. It is not clear how the Government will respond – see Inside Housing January 6 2012.
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moving the uprating to that basis from RPI can be 
compared with predicted market rent increases to 
see if a gap emerges, reducing the real value of the 
LHA. The Scottish Government’s evidence suggests 
that this is so, subject to the usual caveats about 
how the future will unfold.
4. While the absolute numbers may be small, the 
changes to non-dependent deductions will put 
pressure on young people to leave the family 
home and could in some cases lead to large 
reductions in HB (of the order of £10 per week) 
with important differences arising from the 
employment status of the non-dependents. It 
had been recognised in the early 1990s that these 
deductions were a potential source of hardship 
and Labour in Government scaled them back but 
without actually abolishing them. Clearly, this 
change interacts with the new limits to benefit for 
young single people being extended to age 35.
5. While acknowledging a shortage of necessary data 
to fully analyse the under-occupation changes, 
the Scottish Government’s impact assessment 
concluded that around 110,000 social renting 
households of working age might be affected 
in Scotland (i.e. are on HB and have one room 
beyond the bedroom standard).
6. A key second round impact is how private 
landlords respond to the changed benefit 
environment. Essentially, there are two possible 
countervailing effects: landlords may choose 
to reduce rents to retain tenants’ cash flow and 
their ability to pay (a view promoted by the UK 
government) but the cuts may also encourage 
landlords to move away from the low income 
segment altogether. The Scottish Impact 
Assessment is pessimistic, indeed sceptical about 
the scope for landlords to cut rents, though the 
long-term effects on rents must remain  
highly uncertain.
The proposals to reform working age means-
tested benefits by the creation of a single Universal 
Credit intends to deliver something far simpler, and 
also a benefits approach that will display greater 
conditionality and beneficiary responsibility. The 
Parliamentary Bill to introduce the Universal Credit 
and associated welfare benefit reforms is now 
nearing completion. The intention is to introduce 
the Universal Credit for working age households 
in 2013, though this is subject to the necessary IT 
developments and integrations with HMRC. Many 
commentators have expressed scepticism about the 
feasibility of such an early date for implementation of 
the Universal Credit.
The UC will replace:
•	 Income	Support
•	 Jobseeker’s	Allowance	(contributory	and	 
means-tested)
•	 Income-related	Employment	and	Support	
Allowance
•	 Housing	Benefit
•	 Council	Tax	Benefit
•	 Child	Tax	Credit
•	 Working	Tax	Credit
The new Universal Credit will operate on a single 
taper of 65% of net earnings, along with the retention 
of earnings disregards. The new system will have a 
strong conditionality and sanctions emphasis. The 
devolution dimensions are discussed further below.
Council Tax Benefit2 is to be abolished and thus play 
no part in the new reformed system. Instead, the 
sums currently used for Council Tax Benefit are to 
be devolved to local government in England to use 
as they want to mitigate affordability, as part of the 
‘Localism’ reforms, though how this will be done is as 
yet unclear except that it will involve a 10% overall 
reduction in resources. In Scotland, Council Tax 
Benefit will also be devolved with an equivalent 10% 
cut though it is not yet clear how this will happen 
in practice nor how the Scottish Government plans 
to use this opportunity (these changes will occur 
alongside similar devolution of social fund crisis 
loans and community care grants). Like rent rebates, 
Council Tax Benefit is part of the current Scottish 
block settlement and should be relatively easy to 
devolve to the Scottish Parliament per se, but neither 
2  Council Tax Benefit is a means-tested benefit that helps low income households with their council tax payments. It operates in a way quite 
similar to Housing Benefit in that it can pay up to 100% of council tax and it is tapered for those who have incomes in excess of their assessed 
need. However, it operates with a much flatter taper than is the case with Housing Benefit.
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the negotiated settlement of how much it should be 
(last year’s figure or some average amount, etc.) or 
what happens thereafter at a local government level, 
is at all clear.
A further important housing implication of the 
Universal Credit is the application of the so-called 
‘responsibility’ agenda through the proposed end 
of Rent Direct, that is, the ability to pay HB directly 
to the social landlord. Certainly, the aim of the UC 
is to provide the tenant with a single integrated 
payment and the question remains how this might 
be moderated to help landlords with vulnerable 
households and those already in arrears. Second, 
in the long term the DWP anticipates a move from 
housing support based on actual costs (as with the 
current way Housing Benefit works) and a move 
to some form of fixed rate charge (although this 
might be locally-based, as with the Local Housing 
Allowance). Certainly, it is hard to see how the 
Universal Credit can achieve its fundamental goals 
if	Housing	Benefit	remains	separate	and	detached;	
yet, at the same time it remains hard to see how 
such a fixed charge may operate without significant 
imperfections and anomalies arising. This is why some 
relationship to Local Housing Allowance values locally 
may be required though, again, how this will work in 
practice remains unclear yet is critical to the overall 
success of the project.
Littlewood (2011) assessed the potential impact of 
the cumulative welfare reforms on Scottish tenants 
and landlords overall. She found that as many as 20% 
of tenants may face income loss and potentially large 
losses associated with the under-occupation reforms. 
Large losses were concentrated among comparatively 
few tenants. Littlewood argues that prior to benefit 
reform, as many as two-fifths of working age tenants 
on	benefit	were	having	difficulty	with	their	finances;	
hence the consequent impact of the cuts could be 
severe. Arrears might be worsened by this route but 
also by the aforementioned Universal Credit plans to 
end Rent Direct. She also notes that associations in 
areas with high rents would face further difficulties  
if benefit is tied to an averaged regional rent. 
Littlewood goes on to consider wider possible 
impacts on the housing system of these cumulative 
benefit changes on housing options for young 
people;	a	slowing	down	of	all	housing	allocations;	
reduced	household	formation;	increasing	the	use	 
of temporary accommodation, among other 
unintended consequences.
Devolving Housing Benefit
Fundamental to the devolution settlement in the 
1998 Scotland Act was the retention of a unified 
UK tax and benefits system (apart from local taxes 
and the three pence variation powers on income 
tax). In part this was to avoid cross border mobility 
induced by fiscal advantages but it was also to help 
equalise resources and spending across the UK. For 
the first few years of the Scottish Parliament there 
was little appetite to consider further change with 
respect to devolving benefits, let alone Housing 
Benefit (Gibb, 2004) but this has now changed, 
particularly since the election of the first Scottish 
National Party minority Government in 2007, and 
the subsequent Calman Commission on increasing 
devolved financial powers. The election of a majority 
SNP government in May 2011, the Scotland Bill (and 
in large part implementing the Calman Commission 
recommendations), and the localism agenda 
established by the UK Coalition Government have 
added new momentum to the debate. In particular, 
with both independence and possibly full fiscal 
autonomy within the UK (‘devo max’) being subject to 
a referendum, this is an entirely live issue.
Because of the determining role played by councils 
setting rents, rent rebates (and Council Tax Benefit for 
analogous reasons) are budgeted for in the annual 
block settlement received by the Scottish Parliament. 
Westminster assumes a rent (council tax) increase 
and then assumes a Scottish rent rebates bill (Council 
Tax Benefit) – if the rent (council tax) increases are 
greater, this will have to come from out of the rest 
of the block (i.e. it has a direct opportunity cost for 
Scottish spending). Likewise, if increases are less than 
the formula increase, the Scottish block benefits by 
being	able	to	keep	the	difference	and	use	it	for	other	
purposes. The rest of the HB system as it applies to 
housing associations and the private rented sector is 
not	affected	by	these	considerations.	
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The ‘Unionist’ parties in Scotland and the then 
Westminster New Labour Government supported the 
Calman Commission as a forerunner to legislation that 
would examine the scope for increasing Holyrood’s 
financial powers and financial accountability, in 
part as a reflection of Scottish aspirations and also it 
would seem, once again, to attempt to defuse the 
rise of Nationalism. Calman reported in June 2009 
(Commission on Scottish Devolution, 2009) and 
recommended a number of proposals to increase 
financial accountability, such as the devolving of a 
proportion of income tax-raising, limited borrowing 
powers and Stamp Duty Land Tax (SDLT).
The Calman Report also discussed Housing Benefit. 
Recommendation 5.19 referred to Housing Benefit 
and Council Tax Benefit: “There should be scope for 
Scottish Ministers, with the agreement of the Scottish 
Parliament, to propose changes to the Housing Benefit 
and Council Tax Benefit systems (as they apply in 
Scotland) when these are connected to devolved policy 
changes, and for the UK government - if it agrees – to 
make these changes by suitable regulation.”
The UK Labour government introduced a White Paper 
in November 2009 (Scotland’s Future in the United 
Kingdom: Building on Ten Years of Scottish Devolution 
Cm 7738) which proposed to take forward the 
Calman proposals. The new UK Coalition Government 
supported this development and introduced a Bill to 
implement the Calman proposals in November 2010. 
The UK Government decided to drop the benefit 
recommendations, arguing that this should wait till 
after the welfare reform legislation associated with 
the Universal Credit (though, as we shall see, this was 
complicated by the localism agenda). The Scotland 
Bill proposes most though not all of the Calman 
proposals, but it continues to advocate the devolution 
of income tax (partly), Stamp Duty Land Tax and 
limited new borrowing powers, both relevant to the 
housing sphere.
At the 2011 Scottish General Election, the Scottish 
National party advocated the devolution of Housing 
Benefit, seeking to determine its rules and devolving 
legislative responsibility. However, the manifesto 
proposal was not one of the new Government’s 
subsequent six priorities for action, nor did it feature 
in the first set of legislative proposals announced in 
September 2011. There are, however, good reasons 
to treat the devolution of Housing Benefit as a 
continuing relevant question:
•	 The	Scottish	Government	has	not	dropped	its	
manifesto commitment.
•	 Critical	(Scottish)	Parliamentary	debate	on	welfare	
reform and on the welfare reform implications 
of the Scotland Bill indicate a continuing interest 
from the Government and its backbenchers in the 
devolution of welfare, including Housing Benefit, in 
part because of the live issue of Council Tax Benefit.
•	 We	saw	above	that	the	UK	Government’s	Localism 
Bill includes plans to both reduce Council Tax 
Benefit support by 10% and then abolish it as 
a national benefit by devolving the design and 
use of the benefit wholly to local government 
in England. Although the details are presently 
sketchy, the intention is to likewise devolve Council 
Tax Benefit to the Scottish Parliament. This sets an 
important precedent that could readily be pursued 
through a similar devolution of Housing Benefit.
•	 There	is	a	recognition	that	the	combination	of	
Stamp Duty Land Tax, local property taxes and 
a future devolved Housing Benefit represents a 
substantial pot of housing resources (albeit one 
that would be quite volatile in terms of yield). 
Alongside capital spending borrowing powers, this 
may well be attractive and persuasive to Ministers.
The next two sections of the paper explore the in 
principle and practical issues of devolving Housing 
Benefit. The next section looks at the question within 
a context of the existing constitutional and fiscal 
arrangements. The following section then speculates 
on how a devolved Housing Benefit might operate 
within a more radical devolution max world of fiscal 
autonomy and a more general devolution of social 
security benefits.
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3. Devolving HB  
 under existing  
 constitutional      
 arrangements
In this section we explore the devolution of Housing 
Benefit, whilst the rest of the social security system 
remains reserved.
As things stand, Housing Benefit will in time be 
absorbed into Universal Credit for working age 
households. Although details have yet to be finalised, 
it seems likely that rents will be accounted for by some 
fixed formula that does not take into account actual 
housing costs for either social or private tenants. A 
fixed proportion of regional rents is one possibility. This 
will mark a fundamental change in the role of social 
security assistance for housing costs, as it will end the 
long-standing principle that for those with no other 
income all eligible housing costs will be paid. 
Alongside the critical political reaction in Scotland to 
the cuts in Housing Benefit3, the advent of Universal 
Credit might well seem like a suitable point at which 
to devolve Housing Benefit, and to make a ‘clean 
break’. The principal attraction to this approach is that 
Scotland would be able to design its own housing 
allowance, and at the least restructure its design and 
its rules to be more consistent with or supportive of 
other housing policies (and welfare policies)
There would, of course, be risks associated with  
this approach. 
A key risk concerns future budgets for Housing 
Benefit and, related, the initial settlement of how 
much Housing Benefit the Scottish Parliament would 
receive on its devolution. The reform would necessitate 
a settlement between Holyrood and Westminster 
whereby a sum for Housing Benefit were added to the 
block grant. The level of Housing Benefit expenditure 
is the product of the number of claimants and their 
eligible payments. We noted earlier that while rent 
3 Although there would appear to be little likelihood, after devolution of Housing Benefit, that cuts would be reversed.
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rebates are already incorporated into the spending 
block reflecting the need to exert some control over 
local government rent determinations, overall, the 
Housing Benefit system reflects considerable demand-
led risks. It will inevitably fluctuate in unanticipated 
ways according to economic change (e.g. the 
condition of the jobs market) and demographic 
change (e.g. household formation and migration). 
Thus, a devolved Housing Benefit would be much 
more like Annually Managed Expenditure. Whilst this 
is a risk in any form of expenditure, Housing Benefit is 
much more volatile than other items of expenditure. 
Under this scenario, a sum would be fixed at the point 
of devolution and this would thereafter, one presumes, 
be increased in line with the general formula used for 
rent rebates and Council Tax Benefit at present. The 
scale of the settlement is absolutely critical as it is a 
one-off deal that will determine the essential resource 
level open to the Scottish Government for Housing 
Benefit thereafter (unless decisions are taken to make 
use of other block spending resources). 
How well Scotland did out of this settlement might 
be expected to depend on factors such as the point 
in the economic cycle at which devolution occurred, 
although this would presumably be taken into account 
during negotiations, as would any expenditure 
implications of structural change, such as the shift 
to uprating the LHA limit with CPI rather than actual 
market rents. Lessons will be learned from the process 
of devolving Council Tax Benefit (in terms of how the 
settlement is arrived at and rules emerging over the 
use of current year, averages, the economic cycle, etc.). 
It would seem somewhat risky to adopt devolution 
of HB in the hope of successful ‘game playing’ with 
the settlement. A much clearer position is required 
and this may become apparent as a result of the 
negotiations over Council Tax Benefit.
Whether this risk would be worthwhile depends 
on the likely benefits. In principle, Scotland could 
design its own housing allowance. But it would do 
so with no additional resources because this would 
imply top slicing resources out of an already highly 
pressured Scottish Parliament budget and individual 
programmes within it (but see below for one such 
possible route). This means in turn that a devolved 
Housing Benefit operating under the reserved social 
security system with the current level of resources 
could redistribute the value of benefits within its 
current financial envelope and across current 
recipients. However, reform to Housing Benefit 
that involved a substantive redistribution between 
(potential) recipients would, given the income 
maintenance role that is fundamental to Housing 
Benefit, be likely to create some unpalatable choices. 
For instance, if we recall that the income maintenance 
role of Housing Benefit is to protect post-housing cost 
incomes, then it follows that a redistribution in favour 
of one type of household need will be at the expense 
of another (because of the fixed global sum available 
for Housing Benefit).
This is the invidious trade-off and policy bind that any 
meaningful devolution of Housing Benefit (if social 
security remains reserved) must confront and it is one 
that applies just as much if a Universal Credit were to 
be introduced for working age households (bearing in 
mind the reliance of non-working and elderly tenants 
on means-tested benefits to pay for their housing 
costs and maintain their post-housing costs income 
level). Again, it seems risky to advocate a policy of this 
form of devolution if it is essentially premised either 
on no additional resources and hence redistributes 
from within the existing Housing Benefit budget; or 
to alternatively add some unspecified subvention at 
the expense of another existing programme (or tax 
increase) in a context of severe budgetary pressure 
across the overall Scottish budget for the  
foreseeable future. 
At a practical level, any meaningful reform of Housing 
Benefit would require a new level of administrative 
vehicle or agency, for instance, one working at the 
Scottish Government level, replacing or augmenting 
UK social security policy and operational functions. 
Moreover, it would also likely replace administrative 
expertise and capacity at local authority level – 
where so much of present Housing Benefit policy 
actually functions. It would be wasteful to organise a 
devolved Housing Benefit that did not make the best 
use of these existing skills; otherwise, there may also 
be considerable technical and practical difficulties 
providing an efficient system to clients.
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A property resources 
spending ‘pot’ 4
In the previous section, it was noted that the 
possible devolution of Housing Benefit was mooted 
in the context of the Calman package but that the 
subsequent Bill suggested postponing any such policy 
development until after the welfare reform legislation 
was implemented. In this light, it is worth recognising 
the new opportunities created by the new financial 
powers in the Scotland Bill. Arguably, these new 
powers may qualify the rather negative conclusions of 
the above paragraphs. 
By combining the resources associated with Housing 
Benefit along with local property taxes and the 
devolved Stamp Duty Land Tax, it can be seen that 
Housing Benefit might form part of a (hypothecated) 
‘big pot’ of housing resources that could be used 
strategically to fund housing policies and offer some 
choices between the balance or mix of capital, revenue 
and personal subsidies with which to pursue  
housing policies.
However, once again, we need to be clear that it is 
not so straightforward to assume that there will be 
additional resources in this ‘big pot’. Local property 
taxes are of course already being used to fund 
elements of local government spending. Housing 
Benefit’s contribution has already been discussed 
above. The devolution of Stamp Duty will have to be 
negotiated but it is presumed that once the level of 
funding associated with it is agreed, an equivalent sum 
will be taken away from the spending block. Of course, 
it will be up to the Scottish Parliament if it seeks to 
use its new powers on the Stamp Duty to raise more 
revenue and perhaps hypothecate that increment for 
housing. Moreover, Stamp Duty is an exceptionally 
unpredictable source of revenue since it is dependent 
on volatile housing and real estate transactions. This, 
we believe, makes it a wholly unsuitable source of 
revenue for an item of expenditure need (i.e. helping 
meet low income housing costs) that is fundamentally 
demand-led.
The other aspect of the ‘big pot’ idea that is politically 
less attractive is the fact that once the Scotland Bill 
is enacted, Scotland will be responsible locally for all 
property taxes: council tax and SDLT. Property taxes 
are particularly unpopular of course and the current 
Government has already once sought to abolish local 
taxes on property in favour of income. The Liberal 
Democrats are also opposed to local taxes on property. 
There may not be mileage therefore in augmenting 
devolved benefit and SDLT with local taxes. However, 
and more positively, the Scottish Government, in the 
2010 consultation paper Fresh Thinking, New Ideas, did 
appear to support the principle of housing taxes in 
order to reduce house price volatility and speculation.
Overall, the devolution of Housing Benefit within the 
existing constitutional structure therefore represents 
a very significant transfer of risk to the Scottish 
Parliament. Autonomy over the design of Housing 
Benefit in these circumstances, given the likely long-
lasting constraints on overall available resources, 
would inevitably require unpalatable trade-offs which 
do not make such a move either likely or particularly 
desirable. The possible opportunities created by a 
large property resources spending ‘pot’ may be both 
overstated and likely to confront political challenges 
that would reduce its usefulness for housing policy.
4. ‘Devolution max’
4 This idea was raised with the authors by Jim Gallagher, visiting professor at the Law School, Glasgow University, and convener of the Scottish 
Policy Innovation Forum.
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‘Devolution max’ has not been defined formally. 
However, it would clearly require a significant increase 
in the degree of fiscal autonomy over domestic 
taxation and expenditure decisions (including, 
arguably elements of social security), whilst Scotland 
would remain part of the UK. Social protection (largely 
social security spending) is the largest single category 
of UK public expenditure, representing some 30% 
of the total, so this would mark a very substantial 
increase in the powers of the Scottish Government. 
Clearly, there would be limits to fiscal autonomy, since 
Scotland would still share the same currency and the 
same monetary policy. However, the devolution of 
Housing Benefit makes much more sense within this 
context – indeed it would, by definition, be part of it.
Arguably, devolution max involves a greater transfer of 
risk to Scotland than the devolution of Housing Benefit 
alone – simply because of the scale of the budget. 
However, the disruptive potential of Housing Benefit 
within this framework would be commensurably 
smaller for two reasons. First, Housing Benefit would 
be part of a larger social security budget (for the 
UK, according to Pawson and Wilcox, 2010, Housing 
Benefit is about 14-15% of the total UK social security 
budget including tax credits), so variations in demand 
for Housing Benefit would have less impact on the 
total. Second, the tax base would be much wider, since 
the Scottish Parliament would have limited borrowing 
powers (via the current Scotland Bill) and control 
over a range of taxes, including income tax, national 
insurance, VAT and corporation tax.  
Moreover, the potential benefits arising from 
autonomy are greater than is the case in the 
devolution of Housing Benefit alone. Within existing 
budgets,	reforms	would	require	trade-offs,	but	these	
could be made across a much wider range of benefits 
and households, and would be unlikely to be as stark 
as redistribution between Housing Benefit  
claimants alone.
With ‘devolution max’ there would exist the potential 
for a more fundamental reform of housing subsidies, 
including housing allowances, within the context of 
a reformed social security system. Whilst involving 
difficult choices, there would, for example, be the 
4. ‘Devolution max’
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potential to add an allowance for some housing 
costs into mainstream social security benefits, so 
allowing the housing allowance to perform more of an 
affordability	role.	In	turn	this	would	allow	the	kind	of	
‘shopping incentives’ that the Local Housing Allowance 
sought	to	attain	without	such	stark	trade-offs.	So	
eligible rents need not be based on 100% of actual 
rents, and households could be expected to carry a 
proportion of additional housing costs should they 
choose to consume more housing. 
The opportunity would exist, once all social security 
is devolved, to move from the present system, with 
its ambiguous policy aims and limiting constraints 
on the design of housing support (as a result of the 
post-housing cost floor principle that is fundamental 
to the current system) and instead debate moving 
to a more recognisable continental social security 
system that includes a general element of housing 
support alongside a tailored and more efficient 
housing allowance based on a standard charge 
rather than necessarily being dependent on actual 
housing. The way to overcome the structural problems 
identified above with Housing Benefit stems from its 
relationship with the social security system. Altering 
that relationship is the only feasible way forward 
to construct a more functional set of low income 
personal housing subsidies. Devolving both Housing 
Benefit and its related social security benefits would 
allow such a system to be contemplated.
Continental housing allowance systems typically play 
a	much	greater	affordability	role,	whilst	sometimes	
retaining an income maintenance (safety net) element 
within the social assistance system (See Appendix). For 
example, in 2005 the German system was reformed 
so that housing allowance was reserved for people 
in work, in receipt of social insurance benefits and 
pensioners. The social assistance system meets the 
housing costs for other households, in a similar way 
to the UK system when HB was first introduced. We 
think that in principle this has a lot to recommend it 
as a working model for low income help with housing 
costs. What comparisons with other European systems 
might tell us about reforming Housing Benefit is 
discussed in the Appendix. 
More radical reforms might include a tenure neutral 
system, with owner-occupiers included in the same 
scheme as tenants. Whilst this has drawbacks (not 
least as ownership involves the acquisition of an asset 
though helping prevent mortgage default can have 
wider social benefits including stabilising the housing 
market), it is a debate that should be had. 
While not underestimating the problems of benefit 
transition (for instance in securing the support of 
mortgage lenders and those providers exposed to 
cash flow risks from significant changes to Housing 
Benefit), we think that, applied in this way, devolution 
max would also allow the Scottish Government to 
examine housing subsidies across the system as a 
whole, with the ability to set both rent policies and 
demand-side subsidies in a way that is frustrated by 
the current Housing Benefit system’s constraining 
features. It is inconceivable the system could be 
reformed radically without devolution max.
Moving towards a more coherent system on the lines 
sketched	out	above	offers	opportunities	to	make	
progress with other ossified housing finance and 
subsidy debates. It would provide a stronger case for 
moving towards a more coherent uniform rent-setting 
policy, one that might over time move Scotland 
away from the present incoherence of rent levels and 
differentials	across	Scotland.	It	could	also	be	tenure-
neutral across the rental sector and could in principle 
be expanded to help low income homeowners with 
mortgage interest costs. 
By providing a better balance between the income 
maintenance	and	affordability	elements	of	the	
personal subsidy it could, assuming a sensible 
transition to the new system, continue to support the 
existing loan commitments of social landlords, and 
provide	a	basis	to	help	pay	rents	on	new	affordable	
housing projects. Of course, such a design would 
by definition confront the ‘rent direct’ question as, 
like Universal Credit, it would move tenants to being 
responsible for their own payments. Again, a sensible 
transition or piloting of the reforms might make this 
more palatable. It would also make a contribution 
to designing out several of the structural problems 
identified in Section 2 of this paper. In short, though 
not without aspects that might be viewed as 
controversial, a reform along the lines suggested 
here, could be a positive structural adjustment to the 
Scottish housing system.
5. Conclusions
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HB is a priority issue because it is so important to 
Government policies to increase affordable supply, 
because of the cuts and welfare reforms and because it 
highlights many of the present constitutional tensions 
between Edinburgh and London.
We would stress the underlying structural features of 
the HB/social security systems as it currently operates 
since that is both a source of difficulty currently and 
hinders the development of better housing policies 
for low income households. The short run focus on the 
consequences of the cuts is understandable but it is 
the fundamental structure of HB that needs 
to be addressed.
The risks and problems associated with devolving 
HB alone and within the existing financial framework 
would appear to outweigh any benefits of so doing.
However, the room for policy choice created by the 
devolution max proposal to devolve social security 
as a whole is potentially significant and could lead to 
desirable change to low income housing allowances as 
outlined in Section 4 above – by shifting support more 
to a general cash support for low income households, 
containing a general housing cost element, and then 
developing a more efficient housing allowance based 
on a standard charge.  This would be similar in design 
and spirit to recent reforms in Germany. 
Once we move beyond the current devolved 
settlement, it is clear that combining social security 
and Housing Benefit in these sorts of novel ways can 
offer opportunities to reshape our housing subsidy 
systems, drawing on lessons from international 
experience. This should very much be part of the 
ongoing constitutional debate, as should careful 
consideration of the unintended consequences of the 
reform of UK welfare benefits, and of the devolution of 
benefits on housing policies and prospects.
One argument often used against the general 
devolution of benefits is the concern about 
creating benefit tourists who seek out differentially 
advantageous benefits. Might the devolution of 
all or most means-tested social security risk large 
migratory flows to or from Scotland? The economics 
of fiscal federalism is in part premised on seeking to 
prevent policy frameworks that might encourage 
fiscally-induced migrations across borders. Within 
the European Union the evidence on this is mixed 
and unconvincing that this is in fact a major issue 
[contrasting views form this literature can be found 
in Glover, et al, 2001; and De Giorgi and Pellizzari, 
2006]. We might reasonably expect neighbouring 
governments (including Scotland and the rest of the 
UK) to take account of fiscally-induced mobility in 
setting benefit levels, but we should also perhaps 
5. Conclusions
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note the lack of evidence that migration has followed 
on	from	Scotland’s	distinctive	universalist	policy	offer	
for its citizens (higher education fees, prescriptions, 
free transport for the elderly, care for the elderly, etc.). 
Nonetheless, it would be naïve to ignore the issue 
though one suspects that in the absence of firm 
evidence to the contrary, its importance may  
be overstated. 
In this paper we have considered the scope for 
devolving Housing Benefit, a system which arguably 
has important structural shortcomings, in addition 
to the present controversies associated with welfare 
reform cuts and restructuring. The argument has been 
conducted at a relatively high level of abstraction. 
However, we think that the paper should be the basis 
for	more	discussion;	beginning	rather	than	closing	
down a debate. 
We argued that Housing Benefit is likely to be 
challenging and risky if devolved within the current 
settlement between devolved and reserved powers. 
If, however, Housing Benefit and its related social 
security benefits were to be devolved as part of wider 
devolution max – then, while not without risks to 
Scotland,	it	could	offer	the	opportunity	to	tackle	some	
of the key weaknesses in the present system, thereby 
making a significant contribution to the Scottish 
housing system. Of course, if this debate about 
personal housing subsidies were taking place after a 
successful independence referendum, then the scope 
for making progress (and the risks) would be present 
on an even larger scale. 
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APPENDIX: HOUSING 
ALLOWANCES –  
AN INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE
Introduction
The UK housing system is structured on the basis of 
‘residual income’ – i.e. to prevent incomes from falling 
below social assistance levels as a result of housing 
costs. This reflects the absence of an allowance 
for housing costs in mainstream social security 
benefits. This structure creates evident difficulties for 
housing policy. There is a lack of ‘shopping incentive’ 
(incentivising over-consumption) and its impact on 
rents is inflationary (indeed the current structure was 
devised partly to ease the deregulation of private 
sector rents). It also fails to illicit any explicit supply-
side approach – either in terms of new supply or in 
the quality of housing. However, the demands of 
cost control have led to an increasing number of 
restrictions being placed  both on eligible rents and 
on maximum accommodation sizes, meaning that 
even the income maintenance objective is increasingly 
undermined. Meanwhile, whilst Housing Benefit 
is both an in-work as well as out-of-work benefit, 
an additional problem has only recently become 
recognised: that take-up (at around 50%) among 
eligible people in work is much lower than  
take-up overall. Hence, it is also failing in one  
of its original (1972) objectives, and one to  
which recent governments have also attached 
increasing importance.         
Does experience in other countries form the basis for a 
more radical reform of the HB system in Scotland?
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Why and how housing 
allowances in Europe are 
different	from	the	UK
Housing allowances are most developed and widely 
used in north-west Europe, whose countries have 
both developed social security systems, and usually a 
tradition of active state involvement in the provision 
of social rented housing. The EU Study on Housing 
Exclusion (Stephens, et al., 2010) showed that around 
10% of the population in the UK, the Netherlands 
and Sweden live in households in receipt of housing 
allowance (in 2007). Housing allowances are well-
targeted on the poor: between 40 and 45% of people 
living in poor households in these countries receive 
housing allowances, while only 5-7.5% of the non-poor 
receive	them	(ibid.).	However,	where	the	UK	differs	
from Sweden and the Netherlands is in the average 
amount of housing allowance paid: it is, on average, 
more than twice the amount paid in Sweden and 
three times the amount paid in the Netherlands.    
This	key	difference	is	attributable	to	important	
differences	in	social	security	systems.	Whilst	the	
familiar pattern of non-means-tested contributory 
(social insurance) benefits supplemented by means-
tested equivalents (social assistance) are commonly 
found, the former are earnings-related – that is based 
on a proportion of former earnings before earnings 
loss. For many households, social insurance benefits 
are therefore more generous than the UK equivalents, 
which are often set at or below social assistance levels, 
and this explains why UK HB relies on the residual 
income model.
The continental alternative is based on the ‘gap’ 
structure, whereby eligible rent is based on a 
diminishing proportion of actual costs above a 
minimum and below a maximum. Such a system 
creates better (and arguably more equitable) housing 
incentives, but can be made compatible with the 
UK system of social security by allowing the residual 
incomes of many households to fall below social 
assistance levels – which has been the impact of 
previously introduced limits on eligible rent and is  
the inevitable consequence of recent and  
ongoing reforms.
If a future Scottish Government had legal competence 
in social security, and attached importance to 
protecting the residual incomes of households on 
low incomes it would need to introduce a housing 
element into mainstream social security benefits. This 
would, of course, be likely to raise social security costs 
overall because this would benefit all recipients of 
social security benefits (including people who own 
their homes outright), not just those currently entitled 
to Housing Benefit.
What lessons can be drawn 
from the German system of 
housing assistance?
The reform of the German social security and housing 
allowance system provides some clues about housing 
allowance reform within the context of social security.
The housing allowance system in Germany (Wohngeld) 
appears to be far less significant than in Sweden, the 
Netherlands or the UK, being received by fewer than 
3% of the population (about 5% of tenants), but this 
arises from the way in which help with housing costs  
is now structured within a reformed social  
security system. 
The ‘Hartz’ reforms of the German social security 
system created a sharp divide between an insurance-
based unemployment benefit (ALG I), for which 
eligibility lasts 12 months (18 months if aged over 
55), and ALG II which is both income and asset 
tested. People in receipt of ALG II became ineligible 
for Wohngeld, which is consequently now received 
predominantly by people in work (37% of total), 
pensioners (47% of total) and the short-term 
unemployed (7% of total) (figures from Stephens,  
et al., 2010). 
Wohngeld retains many of its historic features, not all 
of which are good. Benefit is awarded on the basis of 
tables	that	adjust	for	general	rents	in	different	regions	
and on the size of dwelling suitable for a household. 
Even allowing for Germany’s low inflation economy, 
the absence of uprating between 1966 and 1990 is 
notable. Irregular updating means that assistance 
is erratic, and uprating tends to occur when the 
economic	cycle	permits	it	(Koffner,	2007).	Nonetheless,	
Wohngeld can now be perceived as a form of housing 
assistance	that	primarily	performs	an	affordability	
function for households either in work or in receipt of 
reasonable pensions. It means that the potential exists 
for a more intelligent alignment between this form 
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of income subsidy and the way in which housing 
is supplied and priced. For example, who is social 
housing for? (Currently, income ceilings to qualify 
for social housing are set much higher than for 
Wohngeld	-	Koffner,	2007.)	What	kind	of	rent	levels	
should it be seeking to achieve? How do these 
relate to the housing allowance? To achieve a better 
alignment between demand and supply subsidies, 
legislative competences would probably need to 
be aligned so that Wohngeld, which is currently the 
legislative responsibility of the Federal Government 
(though co-funded by the States) was devolved 
to the States, which now have responsibility for 
housing policy.
Meanwhile, the bulk of personal housing subsidies 
are now delivered through ALG II and the residual 
social assistance system (Socialhilfe). ALG II 
appears to be not much more generous than UK 
Income Support or Jobseeker’s Allowance, and 
this necessitates an individually adjusted Housing 
Benefit element within it (Unterkunftskosten);	indeed	
in 2005 the housing element in ALG II represented 
one-third of its total cost. This neatly illustrates 
that people on basic social assistance benefits can 
contribute only very modestly to meeting their 
housing costs.
Whilst the divide between a housing allowance that 
is aimed at households in work, temporarily out of 
work, or at people on reasonable pensions, and one 
aimed at protecting the residual incomes of people 
on social assistance, has much to recommend it, 
problems nonetheless are inevitable. The attraction 
of the Universal Credit lies in the simplification, 
and the end to the abrupt distinction between 
people in and out of work, though the problems 
of addressing costs are legion. In the German 
system, housing benefits delivered through the 
social assistance system can provide a kind of safety 
net for people with housing costs. It also creates 
an	anomaly	whereby	households	are	better	off	
claiming support for housing costs through social 
assistance than through Wohngeld. This ‘better 
off’	problem	will	be	familiar	to	historians	of	the	
British Housing Benefit system, which, until the 
early 1980s, also provided two routes for assistance 
with housing costs – the social assistance system 
(then Supplementary Benefit) and Housing Benefit 
(Stephens, 2005). 
Conclusion
The way in which responsibilities are allocated and 
structures created can only make for better or worse 
frameworks in which to devise policy. They do not 
in themselves provide solutions, and may serve to 
highlight	irresolvable	trade-offs.	Nonetheless,	they	
do provide the opportunity to make things better, 
and few would believe that there is an optimal 
alignment between housing and social security in 
any part of the UK.
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The SFHA is the voice of the principal builders 
and	managers	of	new	affordable	housing	for	
rent in Scotland. Housing associations own 
and manage around 40% of the country’s 
affordable	rented	housing	stock,	over	a	quarter	
of a million homes across Scotland. 
We have around 170 members who own or 
manage rented housing in our urban and rural 
areas	and	develop	affordable	housing	for	rent	
and for part-ownership and provide care and 
support to their tenants and others. The SFHA 
also has over 200 commercial members.
The Chartered Institute of Housing (CIH) is the 
professional body for people involved in housing 
and communities. We are a registered charity and 
not-for-profit organisation. We have a diverse and 
growing membership of over 22,000 people – 
both in the public and private sectors – living and 
working in over 20 countries on five continents 
across the world.
CIH Scotland has more than 2500 members 
working in local authorities, housing associations, 
housing co-operatives, Scottish Government and 
Government agencies, voluntary organisations, the 
private sector, and educational institutions.
The CIH is about transforming peoples’ lives 
and communities for the better. We do this by 
ensuring members, others working in housing and 
organisations are equipped to be the best they can 
be. Equipping them to deliver top quality services, 
decent housing and decent communities.
Chartered Institute of Housing Scotland, CIH Scotland, 4th Floor, 125 Princes Street, Edinburgh, EH2 4AD 
T 0131 225 4544     E policy.scotland@cih.org    W www.cihscotland.org 
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